Tomorrow is the 31st anniversary of the Vietnamese army’s takeover of
neighboring Cambodia’s capital of Phnom Penh. The event prompted
controversy; debates and discussion about the ramifications of that
takeover continue today.

In 14 days of 1978, Hanoi’s army, backed by aircraft, moved swiftly across
the Cambodian border, sending Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge fleeing towns
and cities. The Vietnamese captured Phnom Penh Jan. 7, 1979. Hanoi’s
troops remained in Cambodia for the next 10 years, until December 1989.

For the victims of Pol Pot’s genocidal rule, which began April 17, 1975,
and resulted in the deaths of upwards of two million people, destroying
a culture and a society, Jan.7, 1979 was the day of deliverance by
Vietnam. Surely, Vietnam was their “savior” and their “liberator” at a
time when the world watched the horrors of the killing fields.

But others — Cambodians and a host of foreign governments — worried.

The world was still governed by the well-specified rule of law founded on
the principle of absolute, comprehensive, permanent and inviolable
sovereignty and independence. As Singapore argued before the
international community at the United Nations, the world is no longer
safe, and peace and security are no longer assured, if a more powerful
state is allowed to invade a weaker one like Vietnam had done. The
Association of South East Asian Nations spearheaded calls for Vietnam
to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.

As a result, the United Nations and other international organizations
became a political-diplomatic battleground for many years between
proponents and opponents of Vietnam’s invasion.

And it was so that the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Resistance was born, first as
separate armed bands with similar goal and, later, as a loose coalition
of Cambodians of the fallen Khmer Republic, Cambodians of the monarchy,
and the leftovers of the Khmer Rouge, in spite of their differences, to
pressure Vietnam to withdraw, and to seek Cambodians’
self-determination.

Unfortunately, the Paris Peace Accords, concluded in 1991, weren’t implemented
according to the agreements’ stipulations and spirit by participating
parties, including Cambodians.

Cambodian nationalists asked, since 1979, if Vietnam’s goal was to “save” and
“liberate” the Cambodian people from Pol Pot, what prevented it from
surrendering a freed Cambodia and her people to work with the world
community to build a new government and social order? Wouldn’t Vietnam
have received gratitude so profound by ceding to the United Nations the
role of assisting Cambodians’ self-determination?

For many Cambodians, Jan. 7 was a day of infamy. Pol Pot was replaced by
those referred to as Cambodians with Khmer bodies but Vietnamese heads,
the Khmer Viet Minh. This cohort, created by the Vietnamese Communist
Lao Dong, trained at the Son Tay Military Academy and at the Nguyen Ai
Quoc political school, led by a disgruntled regional field commander,
Hun Sen, who sought Hanoi’s support to return to power. It was, they
felt, like replacing cholera with the plague.

Cambodian opponents assert that Vietnam attacked Pol Pot in 1979 because he
became too independent of Hanoi. The invasion was initiated to bring
the insolent back into line.

As French critic Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr said, “Plus ça change, plus
c’est la même chose,” or, “The more things change, the more they remain
the same.”

Look at the history of relations between Cambodia and Vietnam for affirmation.

The Vietnamese southward expansion after Nam Viet freed itself in 939 from
Chinese bondage was described by Vietnamese scholar Nguyen The Anh in
“Le Nam Tien dans les textes Vietnamiens,” as a centuries-long
phenomenon called “Nam Tien” (progression southwards), “one of
Vietnam’s history’s constants.” Anh described the “sparsely populated
and accessible land available for (Vietnamese) rice growers” to the
south as “favorable for encroachment.”

Vietnamese “Confucian persuasion” was abandoned in favor of “an action resolutely
imperialistic” to grab land and impose Vietnamese “administrative and
cultural practice … to better integrate (the new area) into the
Vietnamese space.”

Very briefly, historical records reveal that until the French protectorate
was established in 1863, Cambodia was a battlefield for Thai and
Vietnamese armies that fought on Khmer soil. Khmer dynastic quarrels
led each Khmer side to seek support from Bangkok and Hue. Cambodia was
known as a “two-headed bird” — a tributary state to both foreign
capitals.

In 1833, after Annam defeated the Thais in Cambodia, the Annamization
began: Annam installed teenager Ang Mey as queen, Cambodia’s capital
was renamed “Nam Viang,” Cambodia’s reorganization followed Vietnamese
administrative lines, authorities adopted Vietnamese names, customs and
dress. In 1840, the Cambodian government was seated in Saigon, and
Cambodia’s name was changed to “Tran Tay” — or western commandery.

Opponents of Vietnam’s 1978 invasion see Hun Sen and his ruling Cambodian
People’s Party as a force seeking integration of Cambodia into the late
Ho Chin Minh’s dream of a federation of former French Indochinese
states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

The recently revealed “classified” contingency plan by Thailand for
military action against Cambodia, should the Thai-Khmer dispute
escalate, is seen by Professor Naranhkiri Tith as “exactly what Hun Sen
wanted.”

Logically, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between Sen’s Cambodia
and Vietnam is an important instrument for Sen to invite Hanoi’s troops
— the “liberators” against Pol Pot — to help fight the Thais on Khmer
soil, a repeat of history.

A. Gaffar Peang-Meth, Ph.D., is retired from the University of Guam, where
he taught political science for 13 years. Write him at peangmeth@yahoo.com.