I have written several columns in this space about the Feb. 4-7 border fighting
between Thai and Cambodian troops related to the long-standing dispute
regarding sovereignty over areas surrounding the 11th century Temple of Preah
Vihear, a temple awarded to Cambodia in a June 15, 1962, ruling by the
International Court of Justice.
“It was not the first armed conflict on the border dispute around the Preah
Vihear Temple, nor will it be the last,” I wrote, and “If both armies don’t
withdraw their trigger-happy troops, new rounds of armed conflict are waiting
to happen.” It’s a matter of common sense.
As fanatics on both sides trade vitriolic barbs, parties on both sides have
accumulated documents and maps purporting to show to whom the temple belongs. I
was impressed with the vast knowledge some of those people hold about the
history of the temple and the ICJ’s verdict. Then I realized it was not what
they know but how they think that causes voices of reason to give way to loud,
unproductive emotional rhetoric.
I read with satisfaction that increasing numbers of Thai academics call on
their government to accept that the temple is Khmer, was built by Khmers and
belongs to Khmers. Then I saw Cambodian expatriates’ petitions and rallies
condemning the Thai “invasion.” Some Cambodians would not accept any mention of
a “disputed area” and cast you as an enemy if you persist in use of the phrase.
Premier Hun Sen loves this: talk of Thai aggression/invasion reliably rallies
Cambodians to fight the Thai invasion and deflects attention from other
concerns.
It takes two to make war or peace.
Thai Premier Abhisit has been under fire from the so-called Yellow Shirt
political movement, whose adherents brought him to power and who now think he’s
not up to the task to “win” the temple for Thailand. The next election is
around the corner for Abhisit in July. Meanwhile, the Thai military is
concerned that it might lose influence in Thai politics.
Cambodian Premier Hun Sen, too, is less than two years away from his own
election, and domestic problems have not abated. His restless people needed to
be pulled into line.
Hun Sen has found it useful to deflect Abhisit’s insistence on bilateralism by
pushing for regional or international — United Nations — involvement in
resolving this crisis. He wanted Indonesian observers posted on the border, but
Thailand refused. Hun Sen beats the drum of nationalism loudest to meet the
emotional needs of his people and draw their attention from other problems
confronting him.
On April 22, the deadly border fighting resumed. Initial skirmishes with small
arms at Ta Krabey and Ta Moan to the west of Preah Vihear ended with an
exchange of Thai artillery barrage and Cambodian BM-21 rockets that rained over
each other’s territories. Reports say a Thai military aircraft flew overhead
and Thai troops used cluster bombs, which are banned by over 100 countries.
And, of course, each side accused the other of shooting first — as if this
would absolve them for causing losses of lives and creating property damage and
hardship for residents on both sides of the border.
On April 27, self-exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy circulated an “open
letter” declaring that the Hun Sen government “must step down so that Cambodia
may avoid war and territory losses with both Thailand and Vietnam.” Rainsy
accused the Hun Sen regime of using the conflict with Thailand in the west as a
“political ploy to divert the attention and the anger of the Khmer people from
the aggression by Vietnam in the east, … and from its systematic corruption
when it associates itself with dubious foreign companies to grab lands … and
to plunder our national riches.”
Two days later, the Hun Sen government said it has asked the ICJ to clarify its
1962 verdict. Until the clarification arrives, the question of keeping the two
neighbors from fighting a war is primary.
Even after the deaths of 20 troops and the displacement of up to 85,000
villagers on both sides of the border, Abhisit and Hun Sen, who held talks in
Jakarta under the mediation of Indonesia’s president, refused to withdraw their
troops.
According to one press report, during the ASEAN ministerial meeting on May 6,
ASEAN officials were surprised by Premier Hun Sen’s and his foreign minister
Hor Nam Hong’s belligerent attack on Thailand as an “aggressor.” As host,
Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa stepped in to stop Hun Sen’s
verbal assault before irreparable damage was done.
I learned during my service in the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
from 1980-1989 that the Thais are fearful of sharing Thailand’s borders with
Vietnam and they would be happy to have Cambodia as a buffer between the two
countries — a reason Bangkok supported the Cambodian resistance elements that
opposed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.
So, when Hun Sen appointed a Thai political fugitive, former Premier Thaksin
Sinawatra, as economic advisor to the Cambodian government, Hun Sen directly
challenged the Abhisit government. In addition, Hun Sen has all but placed
Cambodia at the disposal of the Hanoi regime, a further threat to Thailand that
no doubt contributes to the uncompromising vehemence of the Thai government’s
position regarding the disputed border territory.
No solution to the Thai-Cambodian border problem can be found so long as Hun
Sen remains at the service of Vietnam, a country Thailand continues to consider
a regional threat.
A. Gaffar Peang-Meth, Ph.D., is retired from the University of Guam. Write him
at peangmeth@yahoo.com.